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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The need for human reliability analysis 
Despite the evolution of engineering methods and 
fabrication techniques, recent accidents involving 
complex industrial systems within high-technology 
industries such as oil & gas, nuclear and aerospace 
were acknowledged to be consistently interrelated to 
human factors which led to tragic consequences (e.g. 
Rio-Paris Flight 447, Macondo and Fukushima). No 
one can deny the impact of human actions and deci-
sions on the performance of engineering systems, 
hence justifying the need for evaluating the interac-
tion between humans and systems through a suitable 
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA).  
HRA is mainly a predictive tool, intended to esti-
mate the probability of human errors and assess the 
human factors contribution to the overall risk 
through the use of qualitative and/or quantitative 
methods. Essentially, traditional HRA tools consist 
of (i) the identification of potential human erroneous 
actions, followed by (ii) the consideration of internal 
and external factors that could influence the human 
performance, finally resulting in (iii) the estimation 
of human error probabilities. The key step in this 
approach is defining possible tasks to be performed 
by a human operator, considered to be an element or 
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component subjected to failure due to inborn charac-
teristics, thus having an “in-built probability of fail-
ure”. Modifiers known as performance shaping fac-
tors, error-forcing conditions, scaling factors or 
performance influencing factors, depending on the 
methodology, are then applied to adjust the likeli-
hood of human failure when performing the assessed 
task. 
On the other hand, some contemporary approach-
es to HRA such as “A Technique for Human Error 
Analysis” – ATHEANA (Barriere et al. 2000), the 
Connectionism Assessment of Human Reliability 
(CAHR) based on Sträter (2000) and the Cognitive 
Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) by 
Hollnagel (1998) were developed around the princi-
ple that the fundamental element is, in fact, the con-
text in which the task is performed, reducing previ-
ous emphasis on the task characteristics per se and 
on a hypothetical inherent human error probability.  
Several HRA methods comprising both “task-
centred” and “context-centred” approaches are cur-
rently in use. Bell & Holroyd (2009) reported 72 dif-
ferent techniques to estimate human reliability and 
considered 35 as potentially relevant. Further analy-
sis highlighted 17 of these HRA tools to be of poten-
tial use for major hazard directorates. For additional 
details on some of the existing methods, a summary 
of five commonly used HRA techniques in the off-
shore industry and other high-hazard facilities has 
been presented by Moura (2012), where the main 
features of the Human Error Assessment and Reduc-
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tion Technique (HEART), the Technique for Human 
Error Rate Prediction (THERP), the Standardized 
Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR-HRA), the Justification 
of Human Error Data Information (JHEDI) and the 
Systematic Human Actions Reliability Procedure 
(SHARP-1) were reviewed. 
Regardless of the variety of HRA methods availa-
ble to enable practitioners to assess the risks associ-
ated with human error by estimating its probability, 
the substantially high uncertainties related to the 
human behavioural characteristics, interlaced with 
actual technology aspects and organisational con-
text, turn this kind of evaluation into a very compli-
cated matter, raising reasonable concern about the 
accuracy and practicality of such probabilities.  
1.2 The data collection problem 
Swain (1990) argues that the most serious problem 
for HRA is the unavailability of meaningful data (or 
less-than-adequate data) on human performance that 
could assist quantitative predictions of human be-
haviour in complex systems. Posing similar reserva-
tions, The International Atomic Energy Agency 
(1990) report on human error classification and data 
collection stressed this matter, claiming that a global 
data collection scheme would be extremely difficult, 
if not impossible, to create, justifying this unenthusi-
astic view by the amount of data related to each hu-
man error that should need to be generated in order 
to satisfy a wide range of objectives required by ap-
plications dependent on human performance data-
banks.  
Indeed, in spite of some recent efforts to gather 
human performance data and overcome this issue, 
such as Gibson & Megaw (1999) CORE-DATA, the 
accessibility and usage of data is still very limited, 
due to four main reasons. Initially, human perfor-
mance data collection usually begins within a specif-
ic domain, making the classification scheme or tax-
onomies closely associated with the industry where 
the issue was first raised. Trying to transpose terms 
and nomenclatures from one industry to another is 
challenging, thus human error information are likely 
to be captured under different frameworks.   
Secondly, the insertion of the human performance 
data in a HRA, which would have to be subsequent-
ly combined with an equipment/system reliability 
analysis to finally reach a meaningful result in the 
probabilistic safety assessment, is complex and time 
consuming. Consequently, practitioners tend to use 
expert elicitation (or a qualitative approach) as a 
shortcut to include human error data in probabilistic 
risk/safety assessments, leaving the commitment to 
collect quantitative data behind. 
In addition, the data collection and interpretation 
process could lead to significantly different results, 
depending on the data source and the acquisition 
method (field data, simulator data, HRA modelling, 
expert elicitation, operation observation, reporting 
methods, near misses, performance indicators, acci-
dent investigation reports etc.). 
Lastly, despite the increasing complexity of engi-
neering systems and safeguards reduced the possibil-
ity of accidents caused from a single failure, the ex-
act interactions between human behaviour, 
technology and organisation currently required to 
produce the specific chain reaction leading to a dis-
aster are very difficult to predict and highly associ-
ated with a specific work situation, thus unlikely to 
be repeatable. 
2 CLASSIFICATION METHOD 
2.1 The Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis 
Method (CREAM) taxonomy as a common 
framework to classify accidents 
An innovative use of the CREAM taxonomy was 
conceived as a common framework to classify acci-
dents from different industries. Other classification 
methods such as The Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System - HFACS (Shappell et al. 
2007) and the Error Promoting Conditions (EPCs) 
from the Human Error Assessment and Reduction 
Technique (HEART) presented by Williams (1989) 
revealed good potential to be used as a classification 
scheme (in fact, it is one of the central functions of 
HFACS) and were also reviewed. However, the 
former taxonomy has deep associations with avia-
tion accidents (e.g. crew resource management and 
personal readiness), and the latter does not differen-
tiate between human, technological and organisation 
EPCs among the 39 nomenclatures available. In ad-
dition, HEART is designed to be used prospectively, 
i.e. to estimate human error probability, while 
HFACS main application is in retrospective analysis 
of accidents in the aviation field. Therefore, the use 
of both would have implied adjustments to the origi-
nal taxonomies.  
Conversely, the CREAM taxonomy (Figures 1, 2 
and 3) offers a very effective and clear division be-
tween human erroneous actions (phenotypes) and 
their possible causes or contributing factors (geno-
types), grouped by three expressive categories: man, 
technology and organisation. Furthermore, the ter-
minologies are generic and easily associated with 
most industrial sectors. 
 
  
Figure 1. “Technology” taxonomy, adapted from Hollnagel 
(1998). 
     
Figure 3. “Man” taxonomy, adapted from Hollnagel (1998). 
 
A noteworthy feature of CREAM’s original appli-
cation as a Human Reliability Analysis approach is 
the fact that the method was designed for both pro-
spective and retrospective evaluations, whether sup-
porting accident investigations aiming at the search 
for causes, or predicting events that are likely to oc-
cur. This flexibility enables the use of the CREAM 
HRA method as a data input to the chosen classifica-
tion scheme, whether prospectively, via simulation, 
or retrospectively, through the execution of accident 
analysis.    
It is worth to notice that this work applies a “ret-
rospective method” for data collection based on 
CREAM taxonomy, but certainly not following the 
procedures developed by Hollnagel to perform acci- 
 
Figure 2. “Organisation” taxonomy, adapted from Hollnagel 
(1998). 
 
dent analysis. It means that the CREAM retrospec-
tive technique is not used whatsoever, considering 
that the accidents collected were submitted to exten-
sive investigation and the causes and contributing 
factors are already exposed in the reports, being the 
current gap the need for interpretation and classifica-
tion of the data under a common framework. 
3 REVIEW OF 200 MAJOR ACCIDENTS DATA 
3.1 Data Collection 
To deal with uncertainties related to data collection 
and overcome the “less-than-adequate” data problem 
in this research, factual data from accident investiga-
tion reports and case studies were interpreted and 
then organised to fit the scheme presented in Figures 
1, 2 and 3. These accident reports were collected 
from insurance companies, regulatory bodies, com-
missions of inquiry, investigation boards and indus-
try experts, such as MARSH Inc., the Australian 
Department of Industry and Resources (DoIR), the 
Australian National Petroleum Safety Authority 
(NOPSA), the Brazilian National Petroleum Agency 
(ANP), the European Agency for Safety and Health 
at Work (EU-OSHA), the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA), the Norwegian 
Foundation for Scientific and Industrial Research 
(SINTEF), the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway 
(PSA), the UK Department of Employment, the UK 
Health and Safety Executive, the US Bureau of Safe-
ty and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), the US 
  
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board 
(CSB), the US Department of Energy (DoE), the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the US 
Fire Administration (USFA), the US Minerals Man-
agement Service (MMS), the US National Transpor-
tation Safety Board and the US Occupational Safety 
and Health Agency (OSHA). 
These events are listed in Table 1 by industrial ac-
tivity. 
 
Table 1.  Accidents distribution by industry 
____________________________________________ 
Industry           Accidents 
              ________   
              #  %       
____________________________________________ 
Aviation           09  4.50    
Chemicals Factory        29  14.50 
Chemicals Storage        01  0.50 
Construction          12  6.00 
Crystal Factory         01  0.50 
Education           01  0.50 
Fiberglass Factory        01  0.50 
Fireworks Storage        01  0.50 
Food Industry         03  1.50 
Gas Processing         09  4.50 
Gas Station          01  0.50   
Hydroelectric Plant        01  0.50      
Ink & Paint Factory       01  0.50 
Metal Signs Factory       01  0.50 
Metallurgical Industry       06  3.00 
Oilfield Waste Disposal Plant    01  0.50   
Petrochemicals         25  12.50 
Pharmaceutical Industry      01  0.50 
Polymers Factory        01  0.50 
Power Plant          01  0.50     
Refinery            38  19.00 
Sterilisation Services       01  0.50 
Sugar Factory          01  0.50 
Terminals and Distribution     12  6.00 
Tyre & Rubber Factory       01  0.50 
Upstream (Oil & Gas)       36  18.00 
Waste Treatment Plant      03  1.50 
Waste Water Plant         01  0.50 
Water Supply          01  0.50 
____________________________________________ 
 
3.2 Relevance of the data sample 
The UK Control of Major Accident Hazards Regula-
tions (1999) define “major accident” as an occur-
rence (including in particular, a major emission, fire 
or explosion) resulting from uncontrolled develop-
ments in the course of the operation of any estab-
lishment and leading to serious danger to human 
health or the environment, immediate or delayed, in-
side or outside the establishment, and involving one 
or more dangerous substances. Most of the 200 ac-
cidents reviewed fit the United Kingdom’s legal def-
inition for major accident. 
Forty four of the studied accidents accounted for 
1,075 fatalities.  
Of the events analysed, 91 reports included some 
cost information, thus it was possible to calculate a 
gross estimate (using cumulative inflation rate to 
update to 2013 values) of £20.25 billion in material 
losses. Furthermore, it is acknowledged that costs re-
lated to environmental recovery, litigation etc. 
would dramatically increase these figures. For ex-
ample, in a Wall Street Journal article about the Ma-
condo Oil Spill, which occurred in the Gulf of Mex-
ico in April 2010, Fowler (2013) reported that BP 
had already paid around US$ 14 billion in spill 
clean-up; US$ 10 billion to individuals, businesses 
and governments; US$ 4 billion in a criminal settle-
ment; and US$ 2 billion in environmental restoration 
and research. Not to mention the impact on the com-
pany’s reputation/brand, reflected in the stock mar-
ket: Bell (2012) reported a 35.00% drop of BP’s 
stock price from 2010 to 2012.  
Hence, these numbers highlight the significance of 
this research’s data sample. 
3.3 Data collection and classification 
demonstration method 
To demonstrate exactly how the interpretation and 
classification of the data was performed, a heat ex-
changer rupture followed by an ammonia release, 
which occurred in a Tyre & Rubber Factory, will be 
scrutinised on Table 2. This is based on the study 
case publication from the US Chemical Safety and 
Hazard Investigation Board (2011).  
Basically, on 11 June 2008, a heat exchanger con-
taining ammonia has ruptured due to an overpres-
sure, triggered by a failure during the maintenance 
process. One worker was killed and seven others 
were injured during this event. 
 
 
Table 2.  Tyre & Rubber factory classification example  
 
Group Sub-Group  Factor  Justification* 
Man Execution Wrong Place Sequence, jump forward. One operator closed an isolation valve be-
tween the heat exchanger shell (ammonia cooling side) and a relief 
valve, to undertake a maintenance job, specifically a burst rupture disk 
replacement. However, after replacing the rupture disk, the reopening of 
the closed isolation valve was skipped, due to unknown reasons. On the 
following day, another operator closed a block valve to clean the pipe, 
isolating the ammonia pressure control valve from the heat exchange. 
Man Cognitive Observation missed Second operator did not observe closed status of isolation valve and 
  
Function (Ob-
servation) 
closed block valve, isolating the ammonia pressure control valve from 
the heat exchange. Afterwards, he started to steam the process line to 
clean the pipeline. The closed isolation and block valves prevented the 
increasing ammonia pressure from safely venting through either the 
ammonia pressure control valve or the rupture disk and relief valve. 
Technology Equipment Software Fault Information delay. During the emergency, a malfunction in the comput-
erized electronic badge-in/badge-out system delayed supervisors from 
immediately retrieving the list of personnel in their area. 
Technology Procedures Inadequate proce-
dures 
Incomplete text/missing instructions. i) ASME Code requirement to 
have a competent person, capable of releasing the pressure, continuous-
ly monitoring pressure vessels with relief devices blocked or when there 
is a possibility of pressurisation above design limit, was not reflected in 
operating procedures. ii) Supervisors were to account for their employ-
ees using a master list generated from the computerized electronic 
badge-in/badge-out system, but there were no further instructions on 
how to compensate the expected absence of some members of the 
emergency response team. Therefore, the supervisors were unable to de-
tect if there was a missing worker designed as a member of the emer-
gency response team. 
Organisa-
tion 
Communica-
tion 
Communication 
Failure 
Message not received. Turnover documents and sign-off procedures 
that should have alerted whether maintenance was completed or not, as 
well as the current status of the process, were not effective communica-
tion channels. 
Organisa-
tion 
Organisation Maintenance Failure The relief system was not available due to a maintenance failure. Alt-
hough maintenance workers had replaced the rupture disk, the valve 
isolating the rupture disk was not reopened thus the relief valve was not 
available. 
Organisa-
tion 
Organisation Inadequate Quality 
Control 
Inadequate quality control procedures. The information that the isola-
tion valve on the safety relief vent remained in the closed position and 
locked-out was limited to a handwritten note. Although quality control 
measures (lockout/tag-out procedures to manage the work on the heat 
exchanger rupture disk were applied), the progress and current state of 
the maintenance job was not clearly documented. Moreover, there was 
not a post-maintenance quality check to verify if the service was 
properly concluded. 
Organisa-
tion 
Organisation Design Failure Inadequate emergency system design, poor location of instruments and 
alarms. Alarm system was not fit for purpose due to a design failure. 
During emergency, operators were supposed to sound a location-
specific alarm using pull-boxes located throughout the production unit. 
However, the water spray from the automatic water deluge system and 
the ammonia vapour prevented responders from reaching the alarm 
pull-box in the affected process unit. 
Organisa-
tion 
Organisation Inadequate Task Al-
location 
Inadequate managerial rule (deficient organisation of work due to the 
lack of safety principles). After the conclusion of the maintenance job 
(rupture disk replacement), the work order system required the process 
operator to sign-off upon the completion of service. However, there was 
no evidence that this occurred (no signal of a signed copy of the work 
order was found). 
Organisa-
tion 
Organisation Social Pressure Group thinking. Although operating procedures required maintenance 
personnel to obtain production operators’ signatures in work orders and 
keep these documents at production control stations, this was not regu-
larly followed. Therefore, the blatant institutional disregard for proce-
dures shows that the risk perception/understanding of the maintenance 
worker was clearly guided by the working practice among maintenance 
personnel.  
Organisa-
tion 
Training Insufficient Skills Performance failure. Supervisors failed to perform workers headcount 
during emergency measures. Some employees had not been fully 
trained on partial and plant-wide evacuations procedures. Procedures 
established that plant-wide evacuation and shelter-in-place drills should 
be conducted at least four times a year, but such drills had not been 
conducted in the four years prior to the incident. Drills could have indi-
cated problems with the worker headcount procedure. 
* Inferred from evidences and descriptions from the US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (2011) Study Case. 
 
Therefore, in the above example, the operator 
failed to perform the maintenance job sequence, 
skipping the reopening manoeuvre of a closed isola-
tion valve after replacing a rupture disk. The investi-
gation report did not provide further information 
about any person related function (memory failure, 
  
distraction, fatigue, inattention, stress etc.) that could 
have led to this specific phenotype (erroneous ac-
tion). In the following day, another operator over-
looked the status of the isolation valve (here we have 
a clear cognitive function failure – observation) and 
started to clean the process line. After classifying 
two man-related factors, one action error (wrong 
place, sequence, jump forward) and another specific 
cognitive function (observation missed), further two 
technology genotypes (equipment and procedures, 
linked to the escalation of the accident)  and six or-
ganisation genotypes (communication, maintenance, 
quality control, design, task allocation, social pres-
sure and training) were identified. The genotypes are 
the identified factors that caused or contributed to 
the accident or contributed to its escalation. 
3.4 Data Classification Results 
The examination of the 200 major accidents was 
similarly performed, and the following tables sum-
marise the outcomes from these interpretations as 
well as the resulting categorisation. 
 
Table 3.  Data Classification results (main groups). 
_________________________________________________ 
Group               Frequency*  
                 _________ 
                 #  %    
_________________________________________________ 
Man                105 52.50 
Technology             170 85.00 
Organisation             189 94.50 
_________________________________________________ 
*Number of events where groups appeared. 
 
Table 4.  Data Classification results (factors & sub-
groups). 
_________________________________________________ 
Factor        Frequency* Sub-Group  Freq.* 
          _________                ____  
          #  %        % 
_________________________________________________ 
Wrong Time      29  14.50 Execution  50.00 
Wrong Type      27  13.50   
Wrong Object     06  3.00    
Wrong Place      51  25.50  
_________________________________________________ 
Observation Missed   29  14.50 Cognitive 
False Observation    04  2.00  Functions** 45.50 
Wrong Identification   07  3.50 
Faulty diagnosis     25  12.50    
Wrong reasoning    23  11.50 
Decision error     17  8.50    
Delayed interpretation   06  3.00    
Incorrect prediction   07  3.50 
Inadequate plan     18  9.00    
Priority error      15  7.50    
_________________________________________________ 
Memory failure     02  1.00  Temp Person   
Fear         03  1.50  Related   
Distraction       10  5.00  Functions  11.50 
Fatigue        04  2.00   
Performance Variability  02  1.00 
Inattention       01  0.50 
Physiological stress   02  1.00    
Psychological stress   05  2.50 
_________________________________________________ 
Functional impairment  00  0.00  Perm. Person 
Cognitive style     00  0.00  Related 
Cognitive bias     12  6.00  Functions  6.00  
_________________________________________________ 
Equipment failure    123 61.50 Equipment  62.50 
Software fault     03  1.50 
_________________________________________________ 
Inadequate procedure   86  43.00 Procedures  43.00 
_________________________________________________ 
Access limitations    01  0.50  Temporary 
Ambiguous information  06  3.00  Interface  13.00 
Incomplete information  23  11.50  
_________________________________________________ 
Access problems    03  1.50  Permanent 
Mislabelling      03  1.50  Interface  3.00 
_________________________________________________ 
Communication failure  22  11 .00 Communi-   
Missing information   36  18.00 cation   27.50 
_________________________________________________ 
Maintenance failure   70  35.00 Organisation 93.00 
Inadequate quality control 114 57.00 
Management problem   20  10.00 
Design failure     124 62.00 
Inadequate task allocation 111 55.50 
Social pressure     15  7.50 
_________________________________________________ 
Insufficient skills    73  36.50 Training  52.50 
Insufficient knowledge  66  33.00 
_________________________________________________ 
Temperature      03  1.50  Ambient 
Sound        00  0.00  Conditions  10.00 
Humidity       00  0.00 
Illumination      01  0.50    
Other        00  0.00  
Adverse ambient condition 17  8.50 
_________________________________________________ 
Excessive demand    10  5.00  Working   
Poor work place layout  06  3.00  Conditions  11.50 
Inadequate team support  05  2.50 
Irregular working hours  07  3.50 
_________________________________________________ 
*Number of events where factors or sub-groups appeared. 
** Cognitive functions detailed on Table 5. 
 
Table 5.  Data Classification results (cognitive func-
tions). 
_________________________________________________ 
Cognitive Function           Frequency*  
                 _________ 
                 #  %    
_________________________________________________ 
Observation             37  18.50 
Interpretation             63  31.50 
Planning              31  15.50 
_________________________________________________ 
*Number of events where cognitive functions appeared. 
 
Tables 3, 4 and 5 specify the number of appear-
ances of the man-related, machine and organisations 
phenotypes and genotypes in the major accidents ex-
amined. Percentages relate to the total of events 
(200). 
At least one human element was identified in 
52.50% of the cases, with 50.00% of direct errone-
ous actions (phenotypes). Cognitive functions ac-
counted for 45.50%, with the interpretation genotype 
appearing as the most relevant (31.50%). At least 
one technology genotype was recognised in 85.00% 
of the accidents, highlighting equipment failure 
(61.50%) and inadequate procedures (43.00%) as the 
foremost factors related to this group. Organisational 
issues appeared in 94.50% of the accidents, empha-
sising design failures (62.00%), inadequate quality 
control (57.00%) and inadequate task allocation 
(55.50%) as the most significant genotypes within 
the group. 
  
A segregation analysis of the collected data shows 
that the prospect of a single group (man, machine or 
organisation) causing an accident is low. Of the ex-
amined events, only 1.00% show an erroneous ac-
tion with a man-related genotype resulting in an ac-
cident. Technological factors were solely 
responsible for the undesirable outcome in only 
4.50% of the cases, while 8.00% of the accidents 
were due to exclusively organisational factors. Con-
versely, all combinations involving at least two 
groups featured significantly in the dataset. A Man-
Technology arrangement appeared in 45.50% of the 
cases, while a Man-Organisation combination per-
formed in 51.50%. The Technology-Organisation 
pair figured together in 80.50% of the events. In 
45.50% of the cases, the three groups appeared to-
gether. Table 6 summarises these results. 
 
Table 6. Segregation Analysis (main groups). 
_________________________________________________ 
Group / Combination          Frequency*  
                 _________ 
                 #  %    
_________________________________________________ 
Only Man              02  1.00  
Only Technology           09  4.50  
Only Organisation           16  8.00 
Man-Technology           91  45.50 
Man-Organisation           103 51.50 
Technology-Organisation        161 80.50 
Man-Technology-Organisation      91  45.50 
_________________________________________________ 
*Events where a single group or combinations appeared. 
 
It is important to notice that the design failure is 
the most significant single genotype from all three 
groups, appearing with an incidence of 62.00%, 
closely followed by equipment failure (61.50%). 
There is also a close relationship between the de-
sign failure genotype and the man group: 69.00% of 
the erroneous actions (execution errors) were ac-
companied by a design failure. In addition, 58.62% 
of temporary and permanent person related functions 
and 71.43% of cognitive functions were also con-
nected to design failures. Another interesting feature 
can be extracted from a tendency analysis along the 
years, considering the design failure genotype and 
the man group. Figure 4 suggests an increase on the 
percentage of the man group contribution along the 
years, while a stable behaviour of the design failure 
genotype is observed. 
Figure 4. Man and Design Failure contribution along time.  
4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
4.1 Improving robustness of system design  
Even with the notable evolution of standards and 
regulations, the amount of design failures contrib-
uting to accidents does not appear to be reducing 
through time. The absence of a well-developed data 
source related to human performance in complex 
systems in addition to the diversity of human behav-
ioural characteristics might be preventing reference 
documents and guidelines from containing unam-
biguous and direct design rules to deal with human 
interaction. This may, in turn, lead to this apparent 
inertia resisting a decrease in design failure. It could 
be explained by the fact that accidents are rare 
events, thus it is not an easy task to accumulate suf-
ficient data to ascertain tendencies and improve ro-
bustness of system design. Therefore, data collection 
must be a long-term effort and needs to gather sub-
stantial evidence for it to be objectively converted 
into guidelines to be applied by designers.  
This paper indicates that the use of taxonomies 
from a bi-dimensional approach such as CREAM to 
classify data is a potential solution to produce mean-
ingful information from three different types of 
source using the same framework: (i) historical data, 
as demonstrated in this research, plus: (ii) incident 
investigations and (ii) prospective analysis, as in the 
original application of CREAM HRA. The common 
framework to conduct human reliability predictions 
as well as retrospective analysis of events during 
Human Reliability Analysis in a specific facility or 
industry is perfectly able to interface with the pro-
posed classification scheme for past accidents, con-
sidering that they basically share the same taxono-
my. 
The increasing complexity of systems expanded 
the number of defences or barriers that needs to be 
breached in order to result in a major accident, ex-
plaining why accidents related to a single CREAM 
group are uncommon. During this study, the periph-
eral figures of one exact group appearance (1.00%, 
4.50% and 8.00% for man, technology and organisa-
tion, respectively), contrasting with the statistics of 
at least two groups (45.50% for man-technology, 
51.50% for man-organisation and 80.50% for tech-
nology-organisation), showed that the presence of 
two or more CREAM groups is generally necessary 
to produce an accident. However, this complexity 
makes it almost impossible for one individual to an-
ticipate all design nuances and connections with 
human and/or technological factors that could lead 
to undesirable outcomes. In addition, the relation-
ship between design failures and the man group, ex-
plicitly the connection with cognitive functions 
(71.43% were associated to design failures) and exe-
cution errors (69.00% linked to design failures), 
shows that design failure and damage tolerance cri-
teria must include (and be tested against) specific 
  
human related features highlighted by this study.  
This seems to be especially important with a failure 
in human interpretation of system status (wrong rea-
soning and faulty diagnosis), a potential observation 
missed and some execution errors (sequence, timing 
and type).  
Therefore, the figures above indicate that reliabil-
ity analyses should anticipate that cues, measure-
ments or information originally intended to lead to a 
human action have a significant probability of being 
missed. Similarly, if system design allows situations 
in which some system analysis/diagnosis, interpreta-
tion or hypothesis formulation are required before 
taking an action, it is likely that specific cognitive 
functions (inferences, generalisations or deductions) 
will lead to undesirable outcomes. The design 
should also be tested against direct human execution 
errors, primarily focusing on: omissions; jumping 
forward a required action; performing a premature, 
delayed or wrong action; and performing a move-
ment in the wrong direction, with inadequate speed 
or magnitude. 
4.2 Future Developments 
The significance of the design failure genotype indi-
cates a well-defined path for future investigation re-
garding the genesis and perpetuation of human er-
rors. 
Further research could also approach other data 
collection relevant features, due to the significant 
numbers observed in inadequate quality control 
(57.00%), equipment failure and maintenance failure 
(61.50% and 35.00%, respectively), inadequate task 
allocation (55.50%) and training (52.50%). Quality 
control guidelines could possibly join a comprehen-
sive design robustness strategy as a failure identifi-
cation and exclusion tool, while design failure pre-
vention schemes might address both equipment 
reliability and maintenance efficiency. In addition, 
effective operational strategies appear to be connect-
ed to improved organisation of work by clear rules 
and principles and individual performance enhance-
ment through workforce skills and knowledge im-
provements (to handle equipment/perform tasks and 
increase situation awareness). 
Additional effort to expand the data sample is also 
desirable, whether to confirm or increase the robust-
ness of the results. 
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